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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND ITS
FUTURE
Philippe Sands*
I.
The subject of international environmental law is relatively
new. The subject was certainly not taught when the University
of Richmond School of Law was established in 1870, even if
early international law texts before that period did indicate a
nascent concern for the issues of fisheries conservation and the
use of international rivers.' The late part of the last century
and the early part of this one recognized a world in which
international law could be divided, rather simply, between the
law of peace and the law of war. It was a world with few inter-
national courts and tribunals in which international litigation
was truly exceptional. By 1945, the International Court of Jus-
tice had succeeded the Permanent Court, and the Permanent
Court of Arbitration was already well beyond its golden period.
The European Court of Human Rights was yet to be estab-
lished, as was the European Court of Justice.2 In short, there
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1. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, Mar.
19, 1902, in 4 International Protection of the Environment: Treaties and Related
Documents 1615 (Bernd Rister et al. eds., 1981); Convention Establishing Uniform
Regulations Concerning Fishing in the Rhine Between Constance and Basel, Dec. 9,
1869, in 9 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED
DOCUMIENTS 4695; Convention Between France and Great Britain Relative to Fisheries,
Nov. 11, 1867, in 21 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENvIRONIMENT: TREATIES AND
RELATED DOCuMENTS 1.
2. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was established by the July 29,
1899 signing of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
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was virtually no international environmental law, and there
was little international environmental litigation.
I say "little" because it would not be entirely accurate to say
that there was no international environmental litigation. As
early as 1893, an ad hoc arbitration resolved an international
dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom
concerning efforts by the United States to conserve Pacific fur
seals.' Although born in the United States, the seals opted for
a migratory existence, heading for the uninhabited Pribilov Is-
Disputes. See HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 41
(James Brown Scott ed., 1915). The PCA consists of a panel of persons nominated by
the contracting parties. When contracting states wish to go to arbitration they are en-
titled to choose members of the tribunal from the panel. Until the mid 1930s, some
twenty disputes went through the PCA procedure, but since then only about three
cases have been heard.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established in 1945 as the princi-
pal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN), with its statute annexed to the UN
charter. See 15 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 355 (1945). The ICJ is composed of fifteen judges elected by the UN
General Assembly and the Security Council. The ICJ hears cases from UN members
and, subject to conditions, non-UN members alike. The ICJ exercises compulsory juris-
diction only if a state specifically recognizes the general jurisdiction of the court.
Many cases reach the ICJ by way of a compromis, an arbitration agreement between
the parties to the dispute. The ICJ may hear contentious cases and deliver advisory
opinions.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957,
is the judicial institution of the European Community (EC). See Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The primary
task of the ECJ is to ensure the observance and uniform application of EC law
throughout the European Community. The ECJ hears infringement cases brought by
the European Commission against member states under Article 169 of the Treaty.
The ECJ may review the legality of certain acts of European Community institutions
(Article 173 procedures). Moreover, upon motion by the judicial organs of the member
states, the ECJ gives rulings on points of Community law (preliminary reference
procedure under Article 177). The ECJ, unlike the ICJ, exercises compulsory jurisdic-
tion over the member states.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was established by the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was adopted
under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1950. See Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. The ECHR hears
complaints of individuals concerning the violation of their rights under the Convention
by national authorities. The ECHR can only accept cases if the state concerned has
consented to its jurisdiction (so far all parties have done so) and all available nation-
al remedies have been exhausted by the complainant. Where a violation of human
rights has been established, the ECHR may order compensation to the victim.
3. See Behring Sea Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), Moore's
International Arbitration Awards 755 (1893); 2A DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw 881 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafler DOCUMENTS].
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lands.4 Before reaching these islands, most of the fur seals
were caught by British fishing vessels, transported back to the
east end of London, and turned into hats and gloves. Concerned
that the fur seals would be extinguished altogether, the United
States intervened, arguing that it alone possessed the power of
preserving seals, that it was acting as trustee for the benefit of
humankind, and that it should be permitted to discharge that
trust without hindrance even on the high seas. The trust argu-
ment was illustrated in the following way:
The coffee of Central America and Arabia is not the
exclusive property of those two nations; the tea of China,
the rubber of South America, are not the exclusive property
of those nations where it is grown; they are, so far as not
needed by the nations which enjoy the possession, the com-
mon property of mankind; and if nations which have trust
to them withdraw them, they are failing in their trust, and
other nations have a right to interfere and secure their
share.'
The British defense based on high seas freedoms prevailed.6
The United Kingdom successfully argued that it was entitled
under international law to exploit the Pacific fur seals until
they had been entirely exhausted because they lay outside any
nation's territory and, therefore, any nation's jurisdiction or con-
trol. The Arbitral Tribunal, however, proposed international
regulations for the parties to follow, which they did.' Those
regulations marked the beginning of international environmen-
tal law as we know it today.
Some fifty years later, in 1941, Arbitral Tribunal handed
down its infamous award in the Trail Smelter case.' This case
4. The Pribilov Islands, belonging to the United States, are located in the Bering
Sea off the coast of Alaska.
5. Behring Sea Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration, supra note 3, at 853.
6. The freedom of the high seas has traditionally meant that all parts of the sea
including all of its resources, except for territorial waters, are open to use by every
nation, and that no state can acquire sovereignty or exercise rights over any part of
it. For a recent authoritative restatement of the freedom of the high seas, see United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 87, 21 I.L.M. 1261,
1286-87.
7. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINcIPLEs OF INTERNATIONAL ENViRONMENTAL LAW 416-
17 (1995) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 885-87.
8. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1935); see Docu-
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concerned a dispute between the United States and Canada in
which the United States argued that Canada was required,
under applicable international law, to prevent harmful levels of
sulphur fumes from entering the territory of the United States.
The United States prevailed on almost all aspects of the argu-
ment, and the case has sometimes been cited as standing for
the proposition that international law prohibits transboundary
environmental pollution. In fact, it did nothing of the sort. If
the award is read carefully, it will be noted that the Arbitral
Tribunal actually rejected the only argument relating to pure
environmental law which was made, namely that damages
could be recovered for harm to the Columbia River.9
It was only after the establishment of the United Nations in
1945 that the international community really began to address
issues of environment and conservation. In 1947, the United
Nations, by resolution of the Economic and Social Council,'0
convened its first international conference on the conservation
of natural resources." This conference was the predecessor to
the much more widely known 1972 Stockholm Conference, 2
which itself was followed by the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janei-
ro." The 1949 United Nations Scientific Conference on the
Conservation and Utilization of Resources (UNSCCUR) sowed
the seeds for the development of legislation to address interna-
tional environmental issues, giving rise to the possibility of
MENTS, supra note 3, at 85.
9. See Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1931-33; see also PRINCIPLES,
supra note 7, at 641-42. The claim was rejected on a rather narrow interpretation of
the arbitration .compromis. The tribunal found that the relevant provisions of the
compromis regarded "damage" as a general term and thus damage caused by waste
sludge discharged to the river was not excluded. The preamble to the compromis,
however, made specific reference to "damage caused by fumes" and on this basis the
tribunal concluded that any other types of damage fell outside the intended scope of
investigation. See Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 33 AM. J. INTL L. 182, 206-07
(1939).
10. See E.S.C. Res. 32(IV), 1 U.N. ECOSOR, 4th Sess. (1947).
11. See United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization
of Resources (UNSCCUR), Aug. 17-Sept. 6, 1949, 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 481-82; see also
PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 30-31.
12. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972; 11
I.L.M. 1416; see also DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 7.
13. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), June
3-14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874; see also DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 49.
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environmental issues being litigated internationally amongst
the various members of the international community. 4
Over the next four decades or so, matters developed
incrementally. There were new laws, and there were new tribu-
nals. Regional and global legislation was adopted on a wide
range of matters including: oil pollution and water damage in
the 1950s and 1960s; 5 wetlands," endangered species,' the
marine environment, 8 and transboundary air pollution 9 in
the 1970s; ozone depletion ' and fisheries conservation2' in
14. See, e.g., Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Food and Agriculture Organization International Plant
Protection Convention, Dec. 6, 1951, 150 U.N.T.S. 67; International Convention for the
Protection of Birds, Oct. 18, 1950, 638 U.N.T.S. 185; DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at
732; see also, e.g., Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals,
Feb. 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 105; International Convention for High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Oceans, May 9, 1952, 205 U.N.T.S. 65; DOCUMENTS, supra note 3,
at 890.
15. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
16. See, e.g., Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention), Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245.
17. See, e.g., Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural
Habitats Oast modified Nov. 21, 1997) http://www.ecnc.nl/doc/europe/legislat/
bernconv.html> (an example of regional legislation); Convention on the Conservation
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11; Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for sig-
nature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; Fisheries
Jurisdictions (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
18. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pol-
lution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3.
19. See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13,
1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442.
20. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,
1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516.
21. See, e.g., Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlan-
tic Fisheries, Nov. 18, 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 130; Convention for the Conservation of
Salmon in the North Atlantic Area, opened for signature Mar. 2, 1982, 35 U.S.T.
2284.
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the 1980s; and climate change,22 biodiversity? and desertifi-
cation' in the 1990s. This list names but a few of the princi-
pal regional and global developments.
Perhaps even more significant was the integration of environ-
mental considerations into mainstream international economic
law in the late 1980s. The World Bank was called to account
for its disastrous failure to apply environmental safeguards in
infrastructure projects.2 ' And in the early 1990s, two General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Panels,26 in the Tuna
Dolphin cases, raised squarely the question of whether environ-
mental considerations could justify import prohibitions under
GATT law.27
New tribunals were established at which environmental is
sues could potentially be litigated. Alongside the International
Court of Justice, 8 there arrived the European Commission,29
the European Court of Human Rights,"° the European Court of
22. See, e.g., Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849.
23. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822.
24. See, e.g., United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Coun-
tries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1328; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable
Development of all Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 1516/Rev.1,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter Forest Principles].
25. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 39, 593-94.
26. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 1103,
1105 (6), 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
27. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Re-
port on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594;
United States Restrictions of Imports of Tuna, May 20, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 842; see also
PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 694-98. The panels in both cases found that the restric-
tions imposed on the imports of tuna and tuna products by the United States under
the 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act were incompatible with GATT nondiscrim-
ination rules of Article III and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Article
XI. The panels found that these restrictions aimed by the United States at reducing
dolphin mortality did not quality for the "environmental" exemptions of Article XX(b)
and (g). The panels ruled that the United States law could not be applied
"extrajurisdictionally." See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settle-
ment Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra, at 1623;
United States Restrictions of Imports of Tuna, supra, at 898-99.
28. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 47.
29. See id. at 67, 541-42.
30. See id. at 175.
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Justice established by the Treaty of Rome,31  the Inter-
American Commission and Court of Human Rights,32 the In-
ternational Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,"
and the Panel System established under the GATT. By the
early 1990s, those bodies established an embryonic framework
within which issues of international environmental law could be
raised in the context of international litigation. Those bodies
indicated how international environmental litigation would
involve different actors: classic inter-state disputes, cases be-
tween individuals and their own governments, and claims
brought by private investors against host states.
Were the traditional institutions up to the task? Back in
1994, I was invited to contribute a chapter to a book edited by
my colleague Jacob Werksman entitled Greening International
Institutions.34 I was asked to consider the extent to which the
practice of international courts indicated that they had been
"greened." I focused on two bodies, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and
asked three questions. First, had these two courts shown a
willingness to recognize the place of environmental objectives in
the international legal order in respect of which they had com-
petence to adjudicate? Second, had they shown a willingness to
give environmental protection objectives precedence over other
societal objectives? Third, had they appreciated the particular
characteristics of environmental issues?
With regard to the ICJ, I concluded that it "is yet to make a
really significant contribution to the development of internation-
al environmental law, as opposed to simply confirming that
environmental obligations exist."35 For this institution, answers
to the three questions were unclear in 1994. On the basis of
the very limited case law of the ICJ, 6 it simply was not possi-
31. See id. at 68.
32. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673.
33. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
34. Philippe Sands, The International Court of Justice and the European Court of
Justice, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 219-35 (Jacob Werksman ed.,
1996).
35. Id. at 221.
36. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(Aust. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974
1625
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ble to reach conclusions as to the likely direction that the court
would take, even if the establishment by the ICJ of an Environ-
mental Chamber in 1993 3 indicated the Court's recognition of
the growing political importance of the environment in interna-
tional relations. The decision to establish the Environmental
Chamber may indeed have been motivated by the desire to pre-
empt the establishment of a specialized international environ-
mental court, a topic to which I return below.
In contrast to the ICJ, by 1995, the European Court of Jus-
tice had an established environmental case load of over 150
cases. I concluded then that
the ECJ has recognised the place environmental protection
has in the community legal order. It has given (on occasion)
environmental protection objectives an equal (or occasionally
greater) weight over entrenched economic and trade objec-
tives. It has demonstrated a willingness to recognise and
act upon some of the special characteristics of environmen-
tal issues."
I think it is fair to say that the ECJ has been the principal
driving force in developing European Community (EC) environ-
mental law. It recognized that environmental protection was an
"essential objective" of EC law as far back as 1985. 3' At that
time, and in contrast with the situation in EC law, the conclu-
sion with regards to the practice of GATT panels would have
been less rosy, at least from an environmental perspective. The
GATT system remained firmly entrenched within the closed
world of trade lawyers and diplomats. The two Tuna Dolphin
cases of 1991" and 1994"' scarcely addressed the means
whereby environmental considerations could be introduced into
the process of reasoning of those panels.
I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
37. See ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 358, 365
(1996).
38. Sands, supra note 34, at 227.
39. See Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de Defense des
Brfdleurs d'Huiles Usag~es, 1985 E.C.R. 531, 549.
40. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Re-
port on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 27, at 1594.
41. See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 27, at 839.
1626
1999] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
Since 1994, developments at the ICJ have become more inter-
esting. The Court has had the opportunity to address environ-
mental issues in no less than three cases." I had the privilege
of serving as counsel in each, so I have a first hand impres-
sion.' In September 1995, the International Court declined on
jurisdictional grounds to accede to New Zealand's request to
consider the legality of the resumption by France of under-
ground nuclear testing.' Nevertheless, the Court ruled that its
order was "without prejudice to the obligations of States to
respect and protect the natural environment, obligations to
which both New Zealand and France have in the present in-
stant reaffirmed their commitment."5
These words may seem innocuous, but apparently they were
fought over bitterly. What was the court referring to? By refer-
ring back to the pleadings of France and New Zealand, as well
as the five states which sought to intervene-and they're not
easy to find because they have not yet been published-the
pleadings suggest that the Court may have based its decision,
at least in part, on Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declara-
tion46 and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration.' These
declarations provide that states must avoid causing significant
transboundary environmental harm.' The Court was at least
42. See Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 25), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998); Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), re-
printed in 35 I.L.M. 809 (1996) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v.
Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22).
43. With all that implies for objectivity!
44. See Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Para-
graph 63 of the Court's Judgement of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z.
v. Fr.) 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22).
45. Id. at 306.
46. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
June 16, 1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416, 1420 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]; see also DOCUMENTS, supra
note 3, at 7.
47. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, princ. 2, UNCED Doc.
A/CONF.151/Rev.1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M 874, 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; see
also DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 49.
48. See Philippe Sands, L'Affaire des Essais Nucliaires 11 (Nouvelles-Z6lande c.
France): Contribution de l'Instance au Droit International de l'Environnement,
R.G.D.I.P. 447, 459-63 (1997).
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conscious that it had to say something on environmental mat-
ters, even if it was not strictly required to do so.
In October 1995, oral arguments opened in the requests for
advisory opinions from the World Health Organization and the
United Nations General Assembly on the legality of the use of
nuclear weapons. In the nuclear weapons proceedings, there
was considerable argument on a range of environmental issues,
albeit within the narrower confines of the relationship between
environmental law and the jus in bello (international humani-
tarian law governing conduct in armed conflicts). The Court
advised that, in general, the use of nuclear weapons would be
contrary to international law, although in certain circumstances
where the survival of the state was at stake, such use might
not necessarily be illegal.49 Nevertheless, the Court took the
opportunity-again not strictly necessary and by way of obiter
dicta-to advise that "the existence of the general obligation of
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and
control respect the environment of other States or of areas
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of internation-
al law relating to the environment."" The Court went on to
conclude that although international environmental law "does
not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates
important environmental factors that are properly to be taken
into account in the context of the implementation of the princi-
ples and rules of the law applicable in armed conflict."5
Again, lest one might conclude that this was a self-evident
statement of the law, a number of judges considered that the
statement went too far.52 Moreover, the Court declined to give
answers to a range of more specific questions over which the
battle had been joined by states participating in the proceed-
ings. For example, the Court declined to address such basic
issues as the applicability in times of armed conflict of multilat-
eral environmental agreements and the meaning and effect of
various conventional rules of the jus in bello relating to the
49. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 42.
50. Id. at 242.
51. Id. at 243.
52. Judge Guillaume believed that the Court dealt "too quickly with complex
questions which should have received fuller and more balanced treatment, for exam-
ple with respect to environmental law." Id. at 287.
1628
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protection of the environment.53 Difficult questions were side-
stepped.54 Of course, the Court concluded that environmental
considerations alone were not sufficient to make the use of
nuclear weapons unlawful in all circumstances.55 The law, in
other words, did not necessarily prohibit the destruction of the
planet.
The third and most recent case presented the Court with an
opportunity to immerse itself filly in the details of environmen-
tal law. In September 1997, the Court rendered judgment in
the case involving Hungary and Slovakia concerning the
Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project.5 This case concerned a dispute
over whether or not to build certain barrages on the Danube
River shared by Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
The two countries had agreed to build two barrages in
1977.57 Construction began in the early 1980s and proceeded
slowly. In the mid-1980s, political opposition in Hungary fo-
cused on the environmental aspects of the barrages as a means
of achieving broader political change.58 In May 1989, public
pressure led Hungary to suspend work on large parts of the
project. The two countries tried to reach an agreement as to
how to proceed, but both were intransigent. Czechoslovakia took
the view that the barrages posed no threat to the environment,
but Hungary was certain that they would. 9
53. See 6 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 538-40 (G. Hand] ed., 1995).
54. See id. at 531-36.
55. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 42, at 310.
56. Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Judgment 1997 I.C.J. at 3, 37 I.L.M. at 162.
57. See Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977, Czech.-Hung., 1109 U.N.T.S. 235, reprint-
ed in 32 I.L.M. 1247 (1993) [hereinafter Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Treaty].
58. From the mid-1980s, the dam project, which if completed would have resulted
in the destruction of some of the country's primary natural areas, see infra note 59,
was increasingly viewed in Hungary as the symbol of the oppressive communist re-
gime. Thus, the resumption of the already halted works in 1988, triggered various
hitherto inconceivable public actions (demonstrations, campaigns, etc.) that the politi-
cal authorities were unable to control. As a result of the public pressure, in May
1989, the government suspended the project. The success of the anti-dam movement
accelerated the transition of the country into political democracy and eventually paved
the way to the first free parliamentary elections in 1990.
59. Hungary claimed that as a consequence of the operation of the upper dam at
Gabcikovo, the level of groundwater would fall and its quality would be seriously
impaired. As to surface waters, the dam was expected to bring about eutrophication,
and in the absence of a sufficient supply of water, the region's unique flora and fau-
1629
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Absent an agreed upon resolution of the problem, Czechoslo-
vakia decided to proceed unilaterally with a provisional solution
referred to as "Variant C," comprising a single barrage on the
Czechoslovakian side, but requiring the diversion of 80 percent
of the shared water of the Danube River onto its territory.
Czechoslovakia argued that this was justified by the 1977 Trea-
ty, which in effect gave it rights over the water. As "Variant C"
proceeded in late 1991 and early 1992, Hungary believed that it
had no option but to terminate the 1977 Treaty, which provided
the sole basis upon which Czechoslovakia could construct. Nev-
ertheless, in October 1992, Czechoslovakia dammed the Danube
and diverted over 80 percent of the waters of the Danube into a
bypass canal on Slovak territory. An already complicated situa-
tion became even more complicated in January 1993, when
Czechoslovakia split into two countries: the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. The velvet divorce did not extend to the barrages, and
Slovakia took over the rights to and responsibilities for the pro-
ject.
In April 1993, largely under the pressure of the Commission
of the European Communities, Hungary and Slovakia agreed to
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. ° The
Court had an opportunity to address a wide range of interna-
tional legal issues, including the law of treaties, the law of
state responsibility, the law of the environment, and the rela-
tionships between these three areas. Of course, the Court had a
golden opportunity to demonstrate its ability to master the
legal and factual elements in a comprehensive and thoroughly
modern manner.
What did the Court rule? To begin with, it found that Hun-
gary was not entitled, in 1989, to suspend or terminate work on
the joint project solely on environmental grounds.6 The Court
na would be threatened. As a result of the operation of the Gabckovo barrage since
October 1992, there has been considerable damage to the region's biodiversity. As for
the lower dam at Nagymaros, Hungary claimed that serious erosion of the down-
stream riverbed would have jeopardized the yield of the bank-filtered wells that sup-
ply Budapest with drinking water. See Gabcdkovo-Nagymaros Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. at
30, 37 I.L.M. at 182.
60. Hungary-Slovak & Republic: Special Agreement for Submission to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice of Differences Between Them Concerning the Gabcfkovo-
Nagymaros Project, Apr. 7, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1293.
61. See Gabcdkovo-Nagymaros Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. at 70, 37 I.L.M. at 202.
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went on to find that Czechoslovakia, and subsequently Slovakia,
was not entitled to a unilateral solution diverting the Danube
beginning in October 1992 without the agreement of Hungary.
The Court ruled, however, that construction prior to operation
was not unlawful.62 Finally, the Court held that Hungary was
not entitled to terminate the 1977 Treaty in May 1992.3 As to
the future, the Court indicated the basis for cooperation and
agreement, which it hoped the parties might pursue, suggesting
that the preservation of the status quo-one barrage not two,
jointly operated-would be an appropriate solution.'
I think all those who participated in the case would probably
agree that the judgment fell short of the detailed exposition,
which some may have wished for on various aspects of the law,
including environmental law. The judgment may, however,
represent a coming of age for international environmental law,
particularly in that part which relates to the basis for future
cooperation. The Court was plainly unpersuaded by the merits
of Hungary's environmental concerns in 1989. The Court, never-
theless, accepted that there existed a principle of "ecological
necessity" whereby a state may seek to preclude responsibility
for otherwise wrongful acts by invoking the law of state respon-
sibility.65 The Court also accepted that concerns for the natu-
ral environment represent an "essential interest" of the state,
indicating that the test to be applied in determining whether a
state of "ecological necessity" exists is that there must be prov-
en a real, grave, and imminent peril at the time it is invoked,
and that the measures taken are the only possible response to
avoid that peril.66 It is noticeable that the Court did not take
an opportunity to integrate into its test the precautionary prin-
ciple,67 which emerged in the late 1960s and on which there
62. See id.
63. See id. at 71, 37 I.L.M. at 203.
64. See id. at 68, 37 I.L.M. at 201.
65. See id. at 33-35, 37 I.L.M. at 184-85.
66. See id. at 34, 37 I.L.M. at 184-85.
67. The precautionary principle concerns the role of scientific uncertainty in the
environmental decision making. The core of the principle is reflected in Principle 15
that provides "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation." Rio Declaration, supra note 47, at 879;
see PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 208-13. An example of forward-looking application of
the principle can be found in Article 6 of the United Nations Conference on the Con-
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was a large measure of agreement between the parties. With
respect to the illegality of the unilateral assumption by Czecho-
slovakia of control of a part of the Danube, a shared resource,
the Court justified its conclusion principally by referring to the
law of international water courses. The Court only made a
passing mention of the adverse environmental consequences of
the seizure.6" Finally, in relation to treaty termination, the
Court addressed the relationship between a treaty and subse-
quent norms of environmental law, noting that these are "rele-
vant for the implementation" of the treaty, that they could be
incorporated into the treaty, and that they had to be taken into
consideration in implementing the treaty.69
It is in relation to future cooperation that the Court came
closest to grappling with the nuts and bolts of environmental
law. It explained that "[what might have been a correct appli-
cation of the law in 1989 or 1992 ... could be a miscarriage of
justice if prescribed in 1997. "170 This indicates, at the very
least, a recognition of one feature of environmental law: its
propensity to evolve rapidly. Accordingly, the Court stated that
"the project's impact upon, and its implications for, the environ-
ment are of necessity a key issue.' In evaluating environ-
mental risk, "current standards must be taken into consider-
ation."72 The Court recognizes that new environmental norms
and standards have been developed and that they have to be
taken into consideration and given proper weight not only when
states contemplate new activities, but also when addressing
ongoing activities begun in the past. These words are potential-
ly of great significance, possibly even radical significance.7 But
servation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks. See United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks: Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1551-52 (opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995).
68. See Gabctkovo-Nagymaros Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. at 45-46, 37 I.L.M. at 190.
On the law of international watercourses, see PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 346-67; see
also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 LL.M. 700.
69. Gabctkovo-Nagymaros Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. at 57, 37 I.L.M. at 196.
70. Id. at 65, 37 I.L.M. at 200.
71. Id. at 66, 37 I.L.M. at 200.
72. Id.
73. See id. It must be pointed out that by this statement, the Court appears to
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the Court was unwilling to trespass into detail, and it refused
to use the words "environmental impact assessment." Instead,
the Court simply called on the parties to "look afresh at the
effects on the environment of the operation of the ... Power
Plant."74 Invoking the "concept of sustainable development,"
and possibly implying that it has a legal component, the Court
did not offer any legal standards or explain its opinion in prac-
tical terms.75
In sum, the question arises as to whether the ICJ has missed
an opportunity to indicate a real willingness to show its envi-
ronmental credentials? This is not to say that environmental
concerns should have trumped all others. Certainly the Court
demonstrated an understanding of the unique difficulties pre-
sented by environmental issues, of the existence of various
standards to be applied, and of an indication as to how these
could be applied to the facts. And certainly the three decisions
of the ICJ have taken a step toward bringing environmental
considerations into the mainstream of international law. The
decisions, however, do not completely fill the gaps left by treaty
negotiators and do not contribute to the much needed develop-
ment of the law by way of judicial insight. No doubt, the latest
judgment will lead to renewed calls for the creation of a spe-
cialized international environmental tribunal.
II.
Before turning to the question of whether such a specialized
tribunal is necessary or desirable, it is useful to consider the
practice in other international courts and tribunals over the
imply no less than that the special and growing importance of the environment in-
duces a continuous updating and adjusting obligation upon the states, that is to say,
the application of current environmental standards to past operations.
74. Id. at 67, 37 I.L.M. at 201.
75. Id. The Court's treatment of sustainable development may trigger the emer-
gence of some new legal obligations. In spite of being in the core of "soft" environ-
mental law since the Rio Declaration, the potential practical implications of the con-
cept of sustainable development are controversial and remain widely debated. The
debate is fueled in part by the constraints the principle may impose on one economic
development model in favor of another. By invoking sustainable development in rela-
tion to particular environmental obligations, the Court has indicated that, at the very
least, the concept may have legal consequences and that it may be subject to further
judicial clarification.
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last two or three years. Beyond the tribunals already men-
tioned, others either already have or most likely will address
environmental issues. The panel system and the Appellate Body
of the World Trade Organization (WTO),76 the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg,77 the World
Bank Inspection Panel,7" and the noncompliance procedure of
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer79 are all new bodies with a role to play in environmen-
tal issues.
Existing institutions also have a growing role to play. The
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) hosts arbitrations to resolve disputes between investors
and states that are alleged to have interfered with invest-
ments."0 A number of arbitrations currently before ICSID raise
serious issues of international environmental law, including
whether environmental legislation can constitute a form of
expropriation and whether full compensation must be paid
where a taking is for environmental reasons."' Indeed, the
WTO Appellate Body and panels have already been faced with
a number of cases involving environmental issues. 2
Principal among these cases is the recently adopted WTO
Appellate Body decision regarding whether the United States is
entitled to ban the import of shrimp from certain south Asian
76. See Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, New Directions in International
Trade Law: WTO Dispute Settlement, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION 28, 36 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998).
77. See R.R. CHURCHILL & AAV. LOwE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 330-39 (1988).
78. See The World Bank Inspection Panel, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development Res. 93-10 and International Development Association Res. I.D.A.
93-6, Sept. 22, 1993, 34 I.L.M. 503, 520-23; see generally I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD
BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994).
79. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 167-68.
80. See MOSCHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 17 (1993).
81. See, e.g., Canada to Pay $13 Million to Settle Import Dispute, FIN. TIMES,
July 21, 1998, at 6.
82. See, e.g., United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, Panel Report WT/DS2/R, Jan. 29, 1996 & Appellate Body Report WT/DS2/AB/R,
May 20, 1996, WTO Dispute Settlements (visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.sice.oas.
org/dispute/wtorepe.stm#pan>; EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Panel Report WT/DS26/R/US, WT/DS48/RiCAN, Aug. 18, 1997 & Appel-
late Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, Jan. 5, 1998, WTO Dispute Settle-
ments (visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/wtorepe.stm#pan>.
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countries, where the capture of those shrimp leads to a high
rate of mortality for certain species of turtles.83 In 1996, the
United States imposed a worldwide import ban on shrimp and
shrimp products caught in ways that adversely affect sea tur-
tles.' The environmental issue arises because these turtles are
listed by various international conventions as endangered and
subject to requirements of protection.85
The Appellate Body had to decide whether this unilateral
ban" could be justified under the exceptions set out in Article
XX (b) and (g) of the GATT. This article provides that "nothing
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures . .. (b) nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health ... (g)
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.""
Article XX, thus, has the potential of addressing environmental
issues. It is important to note that its chapeau provides that
such measures can be adopted, provided that they are "not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade."'
The Appellate Body ruled that the United States's measures
were legitimate. On the basis of the chapeau to Article XX,
however, the Appellate Body found that the United States' mea-
sures were contrary to Article XX because they were applied in
a discriminatory and arbitrary manner and, therefore, could not
be justified under WTO law.89
Indeed, the Appellate Body appears to have already taken
steps toward integrating environmental considerations into
83. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Panel Report WT/DS58/R, May 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 832, 857; Appellate Body Report
WT/DS58/AB/R, Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118, 175.
84. See Sea Turtles Conservation, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988,
1037-38 (1989).
85. See, e.g., CITES, supra note 17.
86. The ban was prima facie incompatible with Article XI of the GATT that pro-
vides for the elimination of quantitative restrictions.
87. Text of the General Agreement, Mar. 1969, GATT B.I.S.D. at 37-38 (1969).
88. Id. at 37.
89. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Appellate Body Report WT/DS58/AB/R, Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118, 160-75.
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WTO law, most notably in its January 1998 decision in the beef
hormones case.9" The Appellate Body considered the relevance
of the precautionary principle on the basis of arguments put
forth by the European Community. The Appellate Body referred
to the findings of the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,
which recognized that new norms and standards of internation-
al environmental law had been adopted and that they should be
taken into consideration. The Appellate Body, however, noted
that the ICJ did not, in that case, identify the precautionary
principle as such a norm.9"
The World Bank Inspection Panel has received a number of
applications from nongovernmental organizations that raise
issues of general international environmental law, in particular
environmental impact assessment.92 In a number of recent
judgments, the European Court of Human Rights sought (or
not) to integrate environmental considerations into the defini-
tions of various human rights norms, such as the right to priva-
cy and the right to an independent tribunal.93
III.
There are more international environmental laws and more
international courts and tribunals with competence to address
environmental issues. Furthermore, there is a growing willing-
ness among states and other international actors to litigate
internationally. In this context, proponents of a dedicated inter-
national environmental court or tribunal argue that existing
bodies lack the requisite expertise, that the absence of a single
body will lead to a fragmentation in the application of environ-
mental standards, and that the failure of the ICJ to play an
adequate role leaves a major gap. These views are reflected in
the views of Judge Postiglione.94 All of this suggests that the
90. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Appellate
Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, Jan. 16, 1998, WTO Dispute Settlements
(visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.sice.oas.orgIDISPUTE/wtorepe.stm#pan> [hereinaf-
ter EC Measures Appellate Report].
91. See id.
92. For examples of cases, see World Bank Inspection Panel (visited Nov. 14,
1998) <http://www.worldbank.org>.
93. See Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1994); Bahlmer-Schafroth v.
Switzerland, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1997).
94. See A. Postiglione, Instruments for the Resolution of Environmental Disputes at
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international community is poised on the threshold of a new
era of international environmental litigation. I turn now to the
third part of this paper in which I examine whether we need
an international environmental court.
Before addressing this issue, it is necessary to determine the
proper function of an international adjudication. There is a
range of views about this, taking two basic approaches. The
first, which might be called the "minimalist" view, claims that
the function of an international court is to settle only the nar-
row issues presented by a given dispute. In other words, the
proper function is to bring the parties to a solution that is
effective and sustainable over the long term without necessarily
paying regard to the broader policy implications of any judg-
ment for the development of the law. 5 This approach appears
to be dominant among the majority of the current ICJ, for
example. The second view is that the function of an interna-
tional court is not only to assist in resolving the matter before
it, but also to contribute to the development of the law more
generally. Thus, an international environmental court would
take the opportunity to assist the international community by
filling legislative gaps. This more policy-oriented approach is
reflected in the overall practice of the European Court of Jus-
tice. 6 Between these two views come a range of other perspec-
tives.
In the environmental field, international courts and tribunals
are faced with a particular, but by no means unique, difficulty:
the development of international environmental law is largely a
result of international treaties that inevitably involve a high
degree of compromise, or "fudge." In other words, the legislative
body has presented the international judiciary with a set of
rules and principles that are, frankly, rather vague. Called
upon to interpret vague norms, an international court faces a
situation of real difficulty when asked to apply the law to the
particular facts of a case. This is not an easy task, as the ICJ
recognized in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, and one can un-
the Global Level, in TOWARDS THE WORLD GOVERNING OF THE ENVIRONMENT 34
(1996). In Judge Postiglione's view, the need for an international court for the envi-
ronment is justified by practical and theoretical considerations.
95. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 34, at 227.
96. See id. at 230-32.
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derstand the Court's reluctance to descend into detail if to do
so is to adjudicate upon a dispute that has a broader context
and that might lead to changes that the court is legislating.
This is not, however, the only problem faced by international
courts in the environmental domain. A second problem is that
environmental issues invariably raise competing scientific
claims.97 A court will often be called upon to adjudicate on two
sharply differing views, in which mountains of scientific argu-
ments-over 5000 pages in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case-are
presented in an equally compelling manner. Unlike many na-
tional systems that provide for environmental or scientific as-
sessors to join panels and assist in deciphering technical infor-
mation, the international judge likely will be in no better posi-
tion than you or I to decide on the relative merits of a scientific
claim. Again, this problem is not unique to the environmental
field, but it calls for a specialized approach.
A third distinguishing feature of environmental law-and this
is a legal rather than factual characteristic-is that environ-
mental claims are rarely, if ever, raised in isolation of other
international legal arguments. In other words, the environmen-
tal law arguments will almost always involve arguments about
other substantive areas of the law. Such other areas include
trade agreements in the WTO context, human rights norms
before human rights courts, and issues of general international
law, such as the relationships between treaty and custom, or
the law of the environment and the law of state responsibility.
This combination suggests most strongly that an international
tribunal composed solely of experts in international environ-
mental law might not fare well in attracting cases. Therefore,
what is needed is a body of judges with a mix of general and
specialized expertise. This also explains why no cases thus far
have been presented to the ICJ's Environment Chamber, and in
my view, why none may ever do so: no two states will agree
that a given dispute is essentially "environmental."
97. See, e.g., Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3, 27, 29-31 (Sept. 25), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162, 181-
83 (referencing the conflicting and inconclusive scientific arguments in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros litigation); see also EC Measures Appellate Report, supra note 90 (discuss-
ing the extensive treatment of scientific arguments in the beef hormones case).
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A fourth distinguishing feature, relating more to issues raised
before global bodies than regional bodies, is that the interna-
tional community does not yet have a common appreciation of
where environmental objectives stand in the general legal and
political hierarchy. There are understandable differences of view
between developed and developing countries as to what the
priorities should be, and it seems clear that those differences
will also extend to the bench.98 There are equally sharp differ-
ences of opinion between different regions, and even between
developed countries. For example, the current debate over ge-
netically modified organisms indicates that a German judge is
more likely to be risk averse and "precautionary" than an
American judge.99
There is a fifth factor that must be mentioned: states are not
clamoring to establish an international environmental court. As
described above, if states want international adjudicatory mech-
anisms, they do not seem to want those that apply a conten-
tious and conflictual procedure to environmental matters. So,
for example, in the field of ozone depletion, and soon also in
other areas such as climate change and sulphur pollution,
98. Examples include the rather weak protection of tropical forests, essential to
halting climate change, where developed countries with no forests permanently seek
to limit logging in developing countries short of other resources. As a consequence of
this difference in priority, no global agreement was adopted at Rio, only some rather
vague principles, the so-called Forest Principles, were declared. See Forest Principles,
supra note 24. The main international instrument concerned with tropical forests is
aimed primarily at exploitation rather than conservation. The collision of interests
was eloquently illustrated in the negotiation of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention. See
Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1997, 31 I.L.M. 818.
The dispute over issues such as the fair distribution of the benefits from genetic
resources (favored by developing countries) versus the uncompromised protection of
intellectual property rights (advanced by the developed states) or means of provision
of financial resources eventually led to the United States not signing the Biodiversity
Convention. See Melinda Chandler, The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of
Interest to the International Lawyer, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 141 (1993).
99. The precautionary principle evolved out of the German socio-legal concept of
the Vrsorgeprinzip in the early 1930s. This concept, which is broader than the mod-
ern formulations of the precautionary principle, see supra note 68, requiring careful
planning and responsibility, has been relied on widely in (West) German social and
economic legislative activity and judicial practice. See Timothy O'Riordan & James
Cameron, The History and Contemporary Significance of the Precautionary Principle,
in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 12 (Timothy 0Riordan & James
Cameron eds., 1994); Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in
Germany-Enabling Government, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 31
(Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
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states are putting in place noncontentious procedures that are
characterized by having more of an administrative function.
This system exists as a sort of international alternative dispute
resolution. The noncompliance procedure of the Montreal Proto-
col on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer has estab-
lished an implementation committee that requires states alleged
to be in noncompliance to explain why they have reached that
situation and what they intend to do about it. The committee
has the power to impose sanctions, as well as the task of
bringing the state into compliance."°0 For those who have
watched the evolution of the early GATT panel systems into the
quasi-judicial function of the Appellate Body of the WTO, the
picture will be a familiar one.
IV.
So where does all of this leave us? With more international
environmental obligations on the horizon, now is certainly the
time to start thinking about the arrangements we wish to have
in place in the next century to help resolve the disputes that
will inevitably arise, as well as to enhance compliance. The
possibility of an international environmental court should be
kept on our radar screens, but the time is clearly not ripe to
establish such a body. The very fear of its creation may serve
as an inducement for various courts to demonstrate their ability
to address environmental issues. No doubt the creation of an
Environmental Chamber and its obiter dicta in the nuclear
weapons advisory opinion by the ICJ were, at least in part,
efforts to head off the establishment of a new body.
In the meantime, the international community should consid-
er strengthening the noncompliance procedures that are being
established in various multilateral environmental agreements,
and finding ways to fold them into a single body with
overarching functions. There is a need to think about using the
facilities of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to establish a
panel of individuals-with legal or scientific expertise-to serve
as arbitrators and conciliators when disputes arise under envi-
ronmental agreements that do not provide the means for amica-
100. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 167-68.
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ble settlement.' There should be encouragement for new and
existing bodies such as the Hamburg Tribunal, the Hague
Court, and the Geneva Appellate Body, to think more actively
about how they could integrate scientific and environmental
expertise into this decision making process.
Finally, the international community should encourage those
players most directly affected by environmental issues, includ-
ing individuals, NGOs and companies, and the non-state sector,
to continue their efforts to litigate international environmental
issues before human rights bodies, the ICSID and other arbi-
trators, and the World Bank Inspection panel. The time will no
doubt come when these players will gain enhanced access to the
more traditional bodies, such as the ICJ, whether as parties,
third parties, or persons entitled to file amicus briefs.
A few years from now the body of case law will probably
require us to address how to maintain coherence among the
various fora at which international environmental issues are
litigated. The steady increase in international environmental
litigation will continue. As environmental concerns become more
acute, and as environmental interests become ever more closely
related to economic interests, these trends will be enhanced.
Moreover, the growing presence and power of non-state inter-
ests, whether corporate, individual, or NGO, will increase pres-
sure on states to assume clearly defined positions on environ-
mental issues of the day. It is inevitable, therefore, that inter-
national disputes will occur ever more frequently, and we will
be forced to rethink traditional litigation and its alternatives.
But that is for another day.
101. See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13,
1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442, 1448; Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note
22; International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 26, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1014, 1035.
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